The Parting of the Ways: Political Agency between Rational Subjectivity and Phenomenal Selfhood

“We must learn to dissociate subjectivity from selfhood and realize that if, as Sellars put it, inferring is an act – the distillation of the subjectivity of reason – then reason itself enjoins the destitution of selfhood.” – Ray Brassier, The View From Nowhere

1. Introduction: Two Kinds of Subjectivity

The above quote is taken from a paper by Ray Brassier, in which, while championing the important insight of Thomas Metzinger’s theory of phenomenal self-consciousness – that there are no such things as selves – he nevertheless criticises Metzinger for failing to distinguish this from what Wilfrid Sellars, following Kant and Hegel, would call rational self-consciousness – or that there are nevertheless such things as subjects. In essence, he takes Metzinger’s everlasting contribution to be finally allowing us clearly distinguish between phenomenal selfhood and rational subjectivity. The aim of the current paper is to explore this distinction further, by showing how Metzinger’s theory of phenomenal consciousness can be integrated into a broadly Sellarsian theory of rational consciousness, along with some of the consequences of doing so. This is made possible by the fact that both theories are forms of functionalism: they aim to describe how a causal system would have to be configured in order to be conscious, independently of its material substrate. This means that they apply both to the biological forms of consciousness that have evolved on this planet, and to the technological forms of consciousness that we may one day construct.

The divergence between Metzinger and Sellars’ approaches comes out of a difference in emphasis regarding the two aspects of the traditional notion of subjectivity: awareness and agency. Metzinger provides a functional description of consciousness as a form of information processing, supplementing it with a functional description of self-consciousness that, in presenting it as a modification of this sort of information processing, turns the ‘self’ into so much informational mist, letting its substance evaporate under our theoretical gaze. It does this by understanding the way a system becomes aware of both its ‘world’ and its ‘self’ in terms of the way it represents them. I will show that a Sellarsian functional description of consciousness can be built on top of this account of information processing, but that this involves understanding the way a system becomes
an agent capable of undertaking theoretical commitments about its world, and practical commitments about how it will act within it, in terms of its responsibility for them. This lets us see the subject as the stubborn locus of responsibility that refuses to sublimate along with the self. It amounts to a form of normative mineness that will nevertheless be shown to have an intricate relationship with experiential mineness, the consequences of which can only be sketched here.

2. Metzinger: The Dissolution of the Self

Before we can present Metzinger’s theory, it is first necessary to say something about explanation itself. It is entirely possible to hold that nature is composed of a single metaphysical plane, that there is a single mode of individuation of entities upon this plane, and only one form of causation between these entities, while nevertheless admitting that there are many forms of explanation that can be applied to all of this. Ontological univocity is compatible with explanatory equivocity. We won’t say anything more about non-causal forms of explanation. The salient fact for our present enterprise is that we describe causal systems by applying explanatory schema to them that facilitate the development of predictions about the way that they would behave under various possible conditions. These schema provide us with more or less general ways of organising counterfactual reasoning about these possibilities, thereby enabling us to draw specific conclusions about how they would behave in any given set of circumstances.

A functional schema enables us to develop predictions by treating a system on analogy with practical reasoning. This works by allowing us to treat its parts as means in relation to the whole as an end. This lets us describe the causal role of the parts in terms of success and failure, and thereby to organise our reasoning about the causal relations between them in terms of the way failure cascades throughout the system. The explanatory power of a functional schema lies in its introduction of the possibility of malfunction. Metzinger’s theory enables us to distinguish three distinct forms of functional schemata: unconscious drives, conscious systems, and self-conscious systems.

Unconscious drives are causal systems that take variable inputs and produce systematically correlated outputs. The drive schema enables us to understand the systematic correlation between these inputs and outputs, which I’ll call sensation and behaviour, in terms of a single goal state at which the system aims. In essence, we treat sensation as information about the environment that is processed in determining how to behaviourally adjust it in line with the goal state. However, there
need be nothing like a representation of the goal state playing a role within the system at this point, nor need the information involve an internal distinction between the system and its environment. These features emerge at the level of the consciousness schema, and the self-consciousness schema, respectively. The important point is that we can interpret a single system as containing a multiplicity of drives without thereby unifying these drives under a single end. In this case, we see the causal roles of the various drives as either converging or conflicting with one another in the production of overall behaviour, potentially communicating with one another, but never prioritising the various goal-states through some unified information processing activity.

It is the move to the consciousness schema that provides the representational elements necessary to unify disparate drives. This is because a representational schema allows us to extend a functional schema, through enabling us to develop predictions by treating a system on analogy with theoretical reasoning. This works by allowing us to treat its internal states as representing external states of its environment. This lets us describe the causal role of these states in terms of accuracy and inaccuracy, and thereby to organise our reasoning about the causal relations between them in terms of the way they contribute to the success or failure of the system’s functional elements. The explanatory power of a functional schema lies in its addition of the possibility of misrepresentation as a reason for malfunction.

According to Metzinger, a conscious system is one that possesses what he calls a Phenomenal World Model (PWM). This is a functional subsystem that combines information from its various drives into a single store that is made globally available to them simultaneously. This sharing ties them together into a unified processing system with something like a common information format. This common format gives us the purchase we need to interpret the model as an articulated representation of the environment as a whole, with discrete parts that correspond to things within the environment. This is what underwrites Metzinger’s claim that there is a minimal neurological correlate for any distinct representation present within phenomenal consciousness. It is also what lets us interpret the whole model as a representation of the present, insofar as different rates of information flow must all be integrated into a single window of processing. The final element of the consciousness schema is what Metzinger calls transparency, which means that the system must be functionally unable to represent the possibility of global misrepresentation. Some of the elements of the model may become opaque to a degree, by incorporating representations of their own functional structure, and thereby the possibility of its malfunction, but this must never extend to the functional structure of the model as a whole.
Metzinger essentially thinks that conscious systems have an ongoing dynamic simulation of the world, which they are structurally unable to recognise as a simulation. He sometime’s refers to this as a state of online dreaming. Some might be tempted to oppose this to recent work in embodied cognition, which emphasises the extent to which our representation of the world is not self-sufficient, but requires embeddedness in the world to function properly. However, there is no real opposition here. All the PWM requires is a minimal dynamic unity, the elements of which can be threadbare in the absence of regular updates on the state of the environment. This is precisely what we see in offline dreams, where the level of detail and consistency of our representations is minimal, even if it is transparent to the point that we are often unaware of this at the time. For many things, we use our environment as a store of information about itself that can be dynamically accessed by interacting with it in various ways. The process of simulation can thus be extended even if its dynamic unity is localised in the brain.

The self-consciousness schema moves beyond unification by introducing a distinction within the PWM between the system itself and all other aspects of the environment. This constitutes a further subsystem which he calls a Phenomenal Self Model (PSM). The function of this subsystem is to move beyond the unitary sensory processing facilitated by the PWM to a unitary behavioural processing, which it achieves principally by enabling the system to represent not just the goal states it can achieve, but also its capabilities for achieving them. Metzinger is very explicit that PSMs can come in various degree of complexity, but he believes that there are three basic functional elements of human self-consciousness: ownership (the incorporation of PWM elements in the PSM), location (the perspective of the PSM within the PWM), and agency (the recognition of events in the PWM as behaviour produced by the PSM) – each of which can be pulled apart from the other two – and a more advanced functional element characteristic of higher states of human self-consciousness: attentional agency (the control of sensory input and processing).

Metzinger calls the system’s self-representation the Ego. This is the informational content of the PSM at a specific time, as opposed to the functional role it plays at all times. The human Ego contains various forms of information about us qua causal systems, ranging from more or less innate forms of bodily information about body position, integrity and possible action, to more or less acquired forms of cultural information about our social relationships, statuses, and possible negotiation. It also includes mnemonic information, converting the window of the present into a temporal tunnel, by enabling us to retain and recall our own history, and to simulate our possible futures. This is what Metzinger calls The Ego Tunnel. It is the integration of all these forms of
complex information that turns our self-representation from a simple body map into a complex personality.

Metzinger’s argument that there are no selves is fairly simple. The PSM’s functional unity is not persistent: any aspect of it including the whole thing can be switched off an on at any time. This means that any persistence of the self between activations must reside in the content of PSM, or in the identity of the Ego. Metzinger then simply points out that there are no criteria of identity for individuating Egos corresponding to the intuitive self-understanding they involve. Insofar as the PSM is a part of the PWM, it is possible for it to misrepresent things in just the way the PWM does: it can fail to adequately represent the contours of the body, the historical episodes it has been involved in, or its capacities for action. However, the phenomenal continuity of ownership that it generates cannot misrepresent, because there strictly is no unity to represent independent of its own unifying function. The informational facets of personality that it tracks (bodily, cultural, mnemonic, etc.) can all vary independently of one another, making any criteria for binding them together more or less arbitrary.

3. Sellars: The Unification of the Subject

I’m now going to do my best to briefly sketch the way Metzinger’s account can be extended by supplementing it with a Sellarsian rational schema. The real innovation of the rational schema is the introduction of a distinction between two types of informational unit: sentential (S) and non-sentential (NS). This produces a functional distinction between four types of information processes, based on how we pair inputs and outputs: perception (NS > S), action (S > NS), inference (S > S), and coping (NS > NS). The details of the rational schema are how we connect various subsystems capable of performing these different kinds of processing to form a system whose functioning is no longer merely analogous to reasoning, but which actually is reasoning. I’m not going to attempt to provide all these details here, but instead show how the issue of responsibility turns up within this functional story.

The Sellarsian position is that a system is only reasoning once it is keeping track of relations between sentences, and being in this position involves these syntactic units playing a very particular functional role within its informational economy. We can program computers to process sentential inputs into sentential outputs, we can train parrots to produce sentential outputs (e.g., ‘that is red’) in response to non-sentential inputs (e.g., sensing a red object), and we can train dogs to produce
non-sentential outputs (e.g., fetching a stick) in response to sentential inputs (e.g., ‘fetch the stick boy!’) However, a rational agent capable of grasping meaning must be able to do all three of these things, and they must be able to do them in a way which connects them up properly. Sentences are syntactic units capable of playing all three roles within the same system (a state that can be observed, a state that can be inferred from or used to infer another state, and a state that can be brought about). The system needn’t be able to process every sentence in all three ways (I can’t observe ‘several neutrinos have just passed through me’, I (personally) can’t derive the truth of ‘the continuum hypothesis is independent of ZF set theory’ from the ZF axioms, and I can’t bring about the truth of ‘Betelgeuse has gone supernova’), but it must be able to process some set of sentences in all three ways, and able to process some sentence-sentence transitions for every sentence. The semantic content of a sentence is the role that it plays within this functional economy of perception, action, and inference, but its inferential role is what ties this all together, by holding open the possibility that any sentence could be involved in perception and action. It is the capacity for inference that transforms sensation and behaviour into perception and action.

The crucial thing about the capacity for inference is that it requires the ability to dynamically track one’s theoretical and practical commitments, or to reliably keep score of the claims one is responsible for justifying and the aims one is responsible for achieving. This involves the ability to dynamically update one’s commitments, by working out the consequences of existing ones, and revising them on the basis of incompatibilities between these consequences and newly acquired commitments. I’ll call the functional subsystem that does this the Rational Subject Model (RSM). This subsystem in turn requires a capacity to dynamically track a broader space of possible positions than the ones one actually occupies. I’ll call the functional subsystem responsible for this the Inferential Space Model (ISM). These two subsystems are functionally inseparable, insofar as they are two parts of the same dynamic process, but they exist in tension, insofar as the ISM must have the capacity to simulate other subject positions. The thing that functionally distinguishes the RSM from these simulated subjects is its reliability in translating its commitments into actions. Something that could never act upon its commitments could never count as responsible for anything. It is in this sense that rational subjectivity is inseparable from agency.

I’m going to call the function complex of the RSM and the ISM the Core Reasoning System (CRS). This crucial fact about the CRS is that it needn’t be self-sufficient anymore than the PWM. It needs a minimal functional unity, but it can effectively store information in other internal subsystems, including Metzinger’s PWM, and even in external environmental features, including
other rational systems and the larger social systems they constitute. A rational system need not have a static store of sentences that it tracks and updates, as long as it can dynamically call up commitments and inferential relations between them on the fly. We can thus be *phenomenal consciousnesses* that cope with their environment by efficiently processing sensory inputs into behavioural outputs, that nevertheless count as *rational consciousnesses* that perceive and act, as long as we have the capacity to channel this processing through the CRS when necessary. This is the functional essence of Kant’s idea that *rational consciousness* is dependent upon the possibility of *rational self-consciousness*.

The question is now to what extent Metzinger’s problem for phenomenal selfhood can be repeated for rational subjects. Although there are certainly constraints on what can possibly count as a rational subject (e.g., this table cannot be a rational subject because it cannot track its commitments), these constraints still don’t amount to sufficient conditions of individuation. There is no natural way of cutting up continuities and changes in commitments and capacities into unified subjects. However, there cannot be rational consciousness of any kind without self-consciousness, and this means that it is a functional requirement that we have some way of individuating subjects. We need to socially institute criteria of identity, even if these are to some extent arbitrary. However, our criteria are never completely arbitrary, because we are constrained by biological factors regarding the way in which we humans are functionally constructed to track our own states. This means that our individuation of ourselves as rational subjects is to some extent dependent upon our mechanisms for generating phenomenal selves. What this means is that there is a socially mediated functional relationship between the CRS and the PSM. The domain of this social mediation is the political realm, wherein the massive information processing network of brains of which we are a part divides itself up into loci of authority and responsibility, before distributing specific authorities and responsibilities and between them. This makes the nature of political agency far more intricate than our phenomenal life might indicate.

4. Politics: The Menagerie of Agency

The crucial insight suggested above is that politics does not just involve the division of responsibilities between pre-existing subjects, but also the very individuation of the subjects that bear them. However, it also shows that this individuation does not operate without constraint. Nothing can be counted as a particular subject that does not have some capacity to track and act upon the specific commitments it is thereby responsible for. This is the basic form of the principle
that **ought implies can**: one cannot have *any* responsibilities (or corresponding *rights*) unless one is capable of recognising and acting upon *some* responsibilities. There is much more to add to this point, but I will restrict myself to hinting at some of the issues that arise from the framework just proposed:-

i) **Collective Agency:** The mechanism independence of the rational schema implies that it can be applied recursively, so that it is entirely possible for rational agents to function as parts of other rational agents operating at a larger scale. This is what Hegel called *spirit*. This raises issues regarding how we *individuate* collective subjects (e.g., how we count systems such as corporations or states as responsible for their actions) and how we *construct* effective collective agents (e.g., how we constitute anything like *political will*). It also provides an example of the way that rational consciousness and phenomenal consciousness can pull apart, at least insofar as whatever minimal dynamic functional unity a collective subject’s representational systems could be said to have, anything that could be said to be its ‘phenomenal inner life’ would be nothing like our own.

ii) **Overlapping Subjectivity:** The possibility that the CRS can externalise aspects of its functioning implies that these externalised elements could potentially be shared by multiple distinct rational agents. The more one considers the *cognitive resources* required to engage in most reasoning tasks, the more likely it seems that *cognitive outsourcing*, and *cognitive division of labour* play and important part in the way we track our commitments and the inferential relations between them. This suggests that we may be able to discover and analyse the functional structure of a whole range of *socio-cognitive systems* that are not yet collective agents, and that these systems would play an important role in providing collective conditions of individual agency.

iii) **Fragmented Subjectivity:** This in turn raises the possibility that there could be systematic breakdowns of reliable tracking and action in relation to shifting external contexts (CRS networks) and internal contexts (RSM fractures). The reliable dispositions that are constitutive of agency could fragment, and in so doing fragment the subjects to which they are correlated. Just how much fragmentation can be permitted before this disrupts the identification of a given causal system with a given subject is a serious issue, and it forms a part of the larger question regarding criteria of subjective individuation. This fragmentation goes some way to providing more subtle explanations for *akrasia*, or *weakness of the will*,

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on both individual and collective scales.

iv) **Systems of Subjectivation**: The socially instituted norms for individuating subjects cannot simply prescribe the way existing causal systems are divided up into loci of responsibility, but must also prescribe the ways in which new causal systems are to be cultivated so as to be so dividable. This is the ordinarily thought as the political problem of **socialisation**, but it extends beyond the problem of the production and education of new generations of rational agents, to the systems there are in place for maintaining and stabilising the reliable dispositions of agents that are already socialised. These are what Foucault would call systems of **subjectivation**. This extends the study of socio-cognitive systems already proposed to include external factors that play roles in sustaining the minimal dynamic unity of the CRS itself.